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Abstract— In this work the wireless networks security 
algorithms were analyzed. The fundamentals of the WPA and 
WPA2 safety algorithms, their weaknesses and ways of attacking 
WPA and WPA2 Enterprise Wireless Networks are described. 
Successful attack on the WPA2-PSK and WPA2-Enterprise was 
carried out during the performance of work. The progress of this 
attack and its results were described. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
The problem of protecting corporate data every year is 
more relevant. More and more critical data is transmitted over 
wireless networks, and information security (IS) increasingly 
depends on the skills of IT professionals. Many organizations 
and individuals use wireless local area networks (WLANs) as 
an irreplaceable addition to traditional wired LANs. WLANs 
are necessary for mobility, special networks and for access to 
hard-to-reach places. Many modern devices that we use 
(smartphone, tablet, laptop, router, TV), can work with 
wireless networks Wi-Fi. The most common at the moment is 
the IEEE 802.11i standard. 
Any interaction between an access point (network), and a 
wireless client, is built on: authentication - both the client and 
the access point are presented to each other and confirm that 
they have the right to communicate among themselves; 
encryption - which algorithm of scrambling transmitted data is 
used, how the encryption key is generated, and when it is 
changed [1,2]. 
A lot of attention is given to Wi-fi network security. 
However, networks can be tested for security. The purpose of 
this work is to implement attacks on the Wi-fi network 
protected by the protocols WPA2-PSK and WPA2-Enterprise. 
II. SECURITY OF WI-FI NETWORK 
The parameters of the wireless network, primarily its name 
(SSID), are regularly announced by the access point in the 
broadcast beacon packets. In addition to the expected security 
settings, QoS wishes, 802.11x parameters, supported speeds, 
information about other neighbors, etc. are transmitted. 
Authentication determines how the client is presented to the 
point. Possible options: open – so-called open network, in 
which all connected devices are authorized immediately; 
shared – authenticity of the connected device must be verified 
with a key/password; EAP – authenticity of the connected 
device must be verified by EAP with an external server [1,3,4]. 
The openness of the network does not mean that anyone 
can work with it with impunity. To transmit data in such a 
network, it is necessary to match the encryption algorithm 
used, and, accordingly, to correctly establish the encrypted 
connection. Encryption algorithms are as follows: none – no 
encryption, the data is transmitted in clear text; WEP – is a 
cipher based on the RC4 algorithm with different lengths of a 
static or dynamic key (64 or 128 bits); CKIP – proprietary 
replacement of WEP from Cisco, early version of TKIP; TKIP 
– improved WEP replacement with additional checks and 
protection; AES/CCMP – is the most advanced algorithm 
based on AES256 with additional checks and protection [3,4]. 
The combination of Open Authentication, No Encryption is 
widely used in guest access systems such as providing Internet 
in a cafe or a hotel. To connect, you only need to know the 
name of the wireless network. Often, this connection is 
combined with an additional check on Captive Portal by 
redirecting the user's HTTP request to an additional page where 
you can request confirmation (login-password, agreement with 
rules, etc.). WEP encryption is compromised, and it can not be 
used (even in the case of dynamic keys). Widely encountered 
terms WPA and WPA2 determine, in fact, the encryption 
algorithm (TKIP or AES) [2]. Due to the fact that client 
adapters support WPA2 (AES) for quite some time now, it 
makes no sense to apply encryption using the TKIP algorithm. 
The difference between WPA2 Personal and WPA2 
Enterprise is where the encryption keys used in the mechanics 
of the AES algorithm come from. At home and in small 
offices, PSK (Pre-Shared Key) is usually used - a password of 
8 characters. This password is the same for all, and is often too 
simple, so it is vulnerable to selection or leaks (firing an 
employee, a missing laptop, an inadvertently glued sticker with 
a password, etc.) [5]. Even the latest encryption algorithms 
when using PSK do not guarantee reliable protection and 
therefore are not used in serious networks. Corporate solutions 
use a dynamic key for authentication, which changes each 
session for each user. The key can be updated periodically 
during a session using an authorization server - usually a 
RADIUS server.  
Using WPA2 Enterprise requires a RADIUS server on your 
network. At the moment the most efficient are the following 
products: 
Microsoft Network Policy Server (NPS), formerly IAS - 
configured via MMC, is free, but you need to buy a Windows; 
Cisco Secure Access Control Server (ACS) 4.2, 5.3 - 
configurable through the web interface, feature-rich, allows for 
the creation of distributed and fault-tolerant systems, is 
expensive; 
FreeRADIUS - free, configured with text configurations, in 
management and monitoring is not convenient. 
The EAP protocol itself is container, that is, the actual 
authorization mechanism is given for the purchase of internal 
protocols. At the moment, any significant spread has been 
received by the following [2,4]: 
- EAP-FAST (Flexible Authentication via Secure 
Tunneling) - developed by Cisco; Allows you to authorize by 
login-password transmitted inside the TLS tunnel between the 
supplicant and the RADIUS server 
- EAP-TLS (Transport Layer Security). Uses a public key 
infrastructure (PKI) to authorize a client and server (a grantee 
and a RADIUS server) through certificates issued by a trusted 
certificate authority (CA). Requires issuing and installing client 
certificates for each wireless device, so it is only suitable for a 
managed corporate environment. The Windows certificate 
server has facilities that allow the client to generate a certificate 
on its own, if the client is a member of the domain. Blocking a 
client is easily done by revoking its certificate (or through 
accounts). 
- EAP-TTLS (Tunneled Transport Layer Security) is 
similar to EAP-TLS, but the client certificate is not required 
when creating the tunnel. In such a tunnel, similar to the SSL 
connection of the browser, additional authorization is 
performed (by password or otherwise). 
- PEAP-MSCHAPv2 (Protected EAP) - similar to EAP-
TTLS in terms of the initial establishment of an encrypted TLS 
tunnel between the client and the server that requires a server 
certificate. In the future, such a tunnel is authorized by the 
known protocol MSCHAPv2 
- PEAP-GTC (Generic Token Card) - similar to the 
previous one, but requires one-time password cards (and 
corresponding infrastructure) 
III. METHODS OF HACKING WI-FI NETWORK 
For encryption based on WEP, only the time to browse IV 
is required, and one of the many freely available scan utilities. 
For encryption based on TKIP or AES, direct decryption is 
possible in theory, but in practice, hacking cases have not been 
encountered [5,6]. 
Of course, you can try to pick up the PSK key, or the 
password to one of the EAP methods. Common attacks on 
these methods are not known. You can try to apply methods of 
social engineering, or thermal rectal cryptanalysis. 
User can access the network protected by EAP-FAST, 
EAP-TTLS, PEAP-MSCHAPv2 only by knowing the user's 
login-password (hacking itself is not possible). Password-type 
attacks, or those aimed at vulnerabilities in MSCHAP, are also 
not possible or difficult due to the fact that the EAP channel 
"client-server" is protected by the encrypted tunnel. 
Access to the network that is closed by PEAP-GTC is 
possible either when the server tokens is compromised or when 
the token is stolen along with its password [5]. 
Access to a network that is closed by EAP-TLS is possible 
when the user certificate is stolen (along with its private key, of 
course), or when issuing a valid but dummy certificate. This is 
possible only with the compromise of the certification center, 
which in normal companies is protected as the most valuable 
IT resource [6]. 
Since all the above methods (except for PEAP-GTC) allow 
the caching of passwords/certificates, when a mobile device is 
stolen, the attacker gets full access without unnecessary 
network issues. As a preventive measure, you can use a full 
hard disk encryption to request a password when the device is 
turned on. 
IV.  TEST FOR PENETRATION IN WI-FI WITH WPA/WPA2-PSK 
ENCRYPTION 
WPA / WPA2 PSK encryptions are vulnerable to dictionary 
attacks [7]. To implement this attack, you need to obtain a four-
way WPA connection between the Wi-Fi client and the access 
point (AP). 
1. Choose the network we need, see what channel it is and 
fix it in it. After that, we observe what happens in the network. 
2. We collect packages Data Packets and Crypt Packets. 
Their number should increase. If they are equal to 0, then either 
the network does not have clients, or the network card has not 
gone into illegible mode. 
3. If the packages have gone, then we are waiting for the 
appearance in the desired network Handshake. 
4. Kismet program (forms the Passive WPA Handhsake 
Collection - Kismet can now collect handshakes from networks 
and provide them) adds all the useful files to the folder from 
which it was launched. From Handshake we take the password. 
5. Next, create (or find on the Internet) a file with hash 
passwords for bruteforce and run it. Also, instead of searching 
through the dictionary, you can run a search of all the 
passwords in a row. 
6. Troubleshoot the hash passwords. 
Duration of brute force depends on the hardware and 
password complexity: it can last from several hours to several 
days. 
V. TEST FOR PENETRATION IN WI-FI WITH WPA2-
ENTERPRISE ENCRYPTION 
A hacker attack called "Man in the middle" (or MITM in 
abbreviation) is the most serious threat to a properly organized 
WPA2-Enterprise with security certificates [7,8]. 
To test for penetration in such a network, we can create a 
fake Wi-Fi-point with a RADIUS server-and get the login, 
request and response that MS-CHAPv2 uses. This is enough 
for further password brute force. 
We need Kali and a card that supports the work in the mode 
of Access Point  
1. Start Kali Linux. 
2. Connect the Wi-Fi-card via USB-OTG-cable. Launch the 
NetHunter application. 
3. Determine the interface of the connected Wi-Fi card. 
4. Configure the SSID of the hacked Wi-Fi network. 
5. Specify the buffer in which the received logins and 
hashes will be sent. 
6. Write the intercepted data to a file and run Mana. 
7. As soon as the Wi-Fi client is close enough to our access 
point, it will try to authenticate on it. 
8. Stop Mana and check what we caught. 
9. Crack the received hashes. 
The received accounts can be used for further penetration 
into the corporate network via Wi-Fi or VPN, as well as to gain 
access to corporate mail. 
As it turned out, you can not always intercept user hashes. 
Desktop OS (Windows, MacOS, Linux), as well as iOS users 
are protected best. When you first connect, the OS asks if you 
trust the certificate that is used by the RADIUS server in this 
Wi-Fi network. When you substitute a legitimate access point, 
the OS will ask for trust in the new certificate that uses the 
RADIUS server. This will happen even if you use a certificate 
issued by a trusted certification authority (i.e.Thawte, 
Verisign). 
VI. PROPOSITION FOR INCREASE SECURITY 
The maximum Wi-Fi network security is provided only by 
WPA2-Enterprise and digital security certificates in 
combination with the EAP-TLS or EAP-TTLS protocol. A 
certificate is a pre-generated file on the RADIUS server and the 
client device. The client and the authentication server mutually 
check these files, thereby ensuring protection against 
unauthorized connections from other devices and false access 
points. Protocols EAP-TTL / TTLS are included in the 802.1X 
standard and use the public key infrastructure (PKI) for data 
exchange between the client and RADIUS. PKI for 
authentication uses a secret key (the user knows) and the public 
key (stored in the certificate, potentially known to everyone). 
The combination of these keys provides reliable authentication. 
Digital certificates must be made for each wireless device. 
This is a laborious process, therefore certificates are usually 
used only in Wi-Fi networks, which require maximum 
protection. At the same time, it can be easily revoke the 
certificate and lock the client. 
Today, WPA2-Enterprise in combination with security 
certificates provides reliable protection for corporate Wi-Fi 
networks. With proper configuration and use, hacking such 
protection is almost impossible "from the street", that is, 
without physical access to authorized client devices. However, 
network administrators sometimes make mistakes, which leave 
intruders "loopholes" for penetration into the network. The 
problem is complicated by the availability of software for 
hacking and step-by-step instructions, which even amateurs can 
use. 
The administrator must regularly check network traffic for 
suspicious activity, including delays in the transmission of 
packets. In areas where there are critical transactions, it is 
recommended to install Wi-Fi sensors to detect hacking 
activity in real time. 
A special place in the prevention of MITM is the refusal to 
use ssl-bump filtering. It is often used in offices to prohibit 
access to certain sites (social networks, entertainment 
resources, etc.). 
CONCLUSION  
In this paper, a test was conducted for the penetration into a 
private Wi-Fi network and the organization's network, which 
are protected by the WPA2-PSK and WPA2-Enterprise 
protocols, respectively. Both penetration tests were successful. 
Also the proposals to improve the security of Wi-Fi networks 
are described in the work. 
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